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A New Attempt at
Defining an Old Maxim
by The Honorable
Marvin B. Steinberg

here is no better established precept
in American criminal jurisprudence than the prosecution must
convince the trier offact of the defendant's
guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." The
firmness with which this precept undergirds criminal justice is matched only by
the determined, varied and ambiguous attempts to define, in objective terms, this
inherently subjective state of mind.
Since the genesis of American criminal
procedure, a significantly higher degree of
persuasion has been required in criminal
cases than in their civil counterpart. It was
not until the late 1700's that this higher
standard of persuasion was actually termed
"beyond a reasonable doubt." See C. McCormick, Evidence § 341 (2d ed. 1972).
Before the phrase "beyond a reasonable
doubt" was coined, such phrases as "a
clear impression," "upon clear grounds,"
"rational doubt," and "rational and well
grounded doubt" were used to describe the
burden of persuason in criminal cases. See
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
Although unanimously adhered to by virtually all United States courts, the reasonable doubt standard was not established
conclusively as a requirement of the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments until 1970. The United States
Supreme Court had previously, in dicta,
indicated that the reasonable doubt standard was constitutionally mandated. See,
e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 174 (1949) (that guilt in a criminal
case must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt is "to some extent embodied in the
Constitution"); Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (reasonable
doubt standard is implicit in "constitutions ... [that] recognize the fundamental
principles that are deemed essential for the
protection oflife and liberty").
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided In
Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), wherein
the Court stated, "[l]est there remain any
doubt about the constitutional stature of
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the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly
hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged." Id. at 364. The Court
enunciated that:

be so confusing to the jury so as to constitute error to give a correct explanation of
"reasonable doubt." See Lambert v. State,
193 Md. 551, 560-61, 69 A.2d 461, 465
(1949). The Lambert holding was affirmed
in Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 412
A.2d 88 (1980), wherein the court noted:

The reasonable doubt standard plays a
vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The
standard provides concrete substance
for the presumption of innocencethat bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law'.
Id. at 363 (quoting Cojjin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).

The term 'reasonable doubt' is not so
commonplace, simple, and clear that
its meaning is self-evident to the jury.
Even judges, who have 'professional
expertise' and 'experience,' and who,
by their 'legal training, traditional approach to problems, and the very state
of the art of [their] profession ... learn
to perceive, distinguish and interpret
the nuances of the law which are its
warp and woof,' have difficulty construing the meaning of 'reasonable
doubt.' Indeed, in a myriad of cases,
trial judges have committed error by
incorrectly explaining 'reasonable
doubt.' Some unskilled and untutored
lay jurors are at least as likely as some
judges to misconstrue the meaning of
'reasonable doubt.' Consequently, a
correct explanation may well serve the
useful function of enlightening rather
than confusing a jury.
/d. at 242, 412 A.2d at 93 (citations and
footnotes omitted).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has indicated that the failure to instruct a jury on
the necessity of proof ofguilt beyond a reasonable doubt can never be harmless error.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320
n. 14 (1979).
In 1980, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "a trial judge in a criminal
case, must give an instruction explaining
'reasonable doubt' if requested by the accused." Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232,
243,412 A.2d 88,93 (1980). It is this "explanation" of reasonable doubt that has
fostered much confusion for trial judges
and jurors alike. It is exceedingly difficult
to create universally understood reasonable
doubt standards considering the variety of
meanings individuals give to everyday language and experience.
Prior to 1949, many Maryland trial
judges felt the meaning of reasonable doubt
was so difficult to convey that an attempt
to define or explain "reasonable doubt"
would further confuse the minds of the jurors; therefore, these judges refused to attempt to give any definition because it may
have been grounds for reversal. In 1949,
the court of appeals held that it would not

Conversely, a minority of jurisdictions
still maintain that any instruction explaining "reasonable doubt" constitutes error.
See, e.g., People v. Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528,
536,244 N.E.2d 200,204 (1969); Blakely
v. State, 542 P.2d 857,861 (Wyo. 1975).
Upon my judicial appointment to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City and subsequent assignment to hear criminal cases,
I was faced with the dilemma of being required to give an instruction explaining
"reasonable doubt" which I felt served to
create rather than to remove confusion in
the minds of jurors. An instruction regarding "reasonable doubt" as provided in D.
Arronson, Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and Commentary § 1.04 (1975),

or a slight modification thereto, was being
used by many of my colleagues and was
suggested for my use. Section 1.04 provides in pertinent part:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt founded
upon reason. It is not a fanciful doubt
or a whimsical or capricious doubt. It
is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in the
graver or more important transactions
oflife. Thus, if the evidence is of such
a character as to persuade you of the
truth of the charges against the defendant with the same force that would be
sufficient to persuade you to act on
that abiding conviction of truth in the
graver or more important transactions
of your own life, you may conclude
that the state has met its burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
to a moral certainty.
In my opinion, the terminology of this instruction did not aid the juror in comprehending the "reasonable doubt" standard;
rather, the terminology made the definition more obscure by focusing the juror's
consideration on certain principles without attempting to explain to the juror a
standard by which these principles could
be applied.
Recognizing that Maryland appellate
courts have approved diverse versions of
reasonable doubt instructions and have
held there is no one instruction that must
be given, see Montgomery v. State, 292 Md.
84, 95, 437 A.2d 654, 659-60 (1981), I
chose to develop my own reasonable doubt
instruction. I tried to develop an instruction that would include basic concepts,
would aid the jurors in comprehending
reasonable doubt without adding confusion, and would allow the jurors to relate
"reasonable doubt" to events familiar to
them. The following instruction was the
result:
With regard to reasonable doubt, it
can be explained in many ways, and
I usually like to have something explained to me by comparing it with
something else.
Reasonable doubt refers to the degree to which you are convinced about
something, and if you think for a minute and think about the decisions that
you have made in your life, sometimes
your mind is evenly divided. You
might call that six of one, half dozen of
another, evenly divided.
The State's burden is more than that;
you have to be convinced beyond that
of the defendant's guilt. Sometimes
you think of something and you will
say to yourself, "Well it is probably so,

possibly not so, but probably so." The
State's burden of proof in a criminal
case goes beyond that, it must be more
than probably so.
Sometimes you are absolutely and
totally convinced of something the
witness said, "2 + 2 is 4." Absolutely,
we know that this is true. The State
does not have to prove its case to that
kind of absolute certainty, so that
when we say beyond a reasonable
doubt, we mean that you must be convinced more than probably, but not
necessarily absolutely.
You [can not] have any reasonable
doubt. You can have some doubt but
only to the extent anything is possible,
but you must not have reasonable
doubt. If you have reasonable doubt,
you have to find the defendant not
guilty.
If you are convinced to such a degree, so that you would on that basis
make a decision in your own life, an
important decision based on that state
of being convinced, then you could
say that "yes" you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but if you
would not make that decision because
your doubt is reasonable, then you
would say you are not convinced at
that point and that you do have reasonable doubt.
It is only complicated in the explaining. It is not really that complicated
when you try and relate it to your
everyday life, and if you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that this
defendant is guilty, then your verdict
should be guilty. If you are not so convinced, then your verdict should be
not guilty.
The only limit the court of appeals has
placed on the giving of a reasonable doubt
instruction is that the instruction must be
more than a mere statement that reasonable
doubt is doubt based on reason, Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84,95,437 A.2d 654,
660 (1981). The instruction must focus
the jurors "attention on the grave importance of their decision based on the evidence and their commitment to be bound
by the result." Id. As long as the instruction is a correct statement of the law, the
particular phraseology is not important.
In sum, the inherently subjective nature
of the "reasonable doubt" standard invariably creates difficulties when one attempts
to convey its meaning to another. Some
guidance, however, is necessary. Moreover, the shorter and personally familiar
the instruction can be to an individual juror, the greater the guarantee that no person will be deprived oflife or liberty unless

the jurors are convinced upon their consciences that the evidence before them is
sufficient proofbeyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which that person is charged.

Judge Marvin B. Steinberg is a graduate of the University of Baltimore School
of Law. He is a Judge for the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City and is presently
a member of the Council for the Maryland State Bar Association's Section on
Judicial Administration.
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